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I. INTRODUCTION
At their most fundamental level, the circuit courts are meant to
serve as conduits, keeping district courts in line with Supreme Court
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interpretations of federal law.1 Due to a deluge of cases and a backlogged
Supreme Court docket, however, often the circuits are themselves the last
word on issues of federal law.2 Circuit splits develop easily in this
reality, and while those splits are appealing to the Supreme Court as
issues for certiorari, many of their underlying substantive issues simply
will never be addressed by the Court.3 Consequently, when the Supreme
Court leaves open a potential question of federal law, the role of the
circuit courts in providing an answer is fraught with competing tensions.4
Circuit courts confront the admittedly obvious fact that “the law of the
circuit,” or circuit interpretation of a question of law, ought to be
correct.5 They also face the concern that if one circuit’s decision differs
from another, the potential for uncertainty and differential treatment
arises, and the resulting split creates a potentially damaging lack of
uniformity in federal law.6 Still, there are certain situations where district
courts find themselves in dire need of instruction, and these require an
elevated level of risk-taking by the circuit courts.7
When viewing a constitutional question posed to the circuit courts
against this backdrop, an analysis of the courts’ willingness to take risks
in guiding the district courts becomes particularly relevant. Three recent
Supreme Court cases, Apprendi v. New Jersey,8 Blakely v. Washington,9
and United States v. Booker,10 created a unique atmosphere in which to
view the above-mentioned tensions arising both from the circuit court’s
role of conduit and from the duty to offer instruction to the lower
courts.11 These three cases, involving the constitutionality of criminal
sentencing procedures, created a situation in which the circuit courts,
faced with a pervasive and time-sensitive issue, acted conservatively
overall. Few of the courts took risks, but those that did were ultimately
the most effective in their role of conduit and guide.

1
See Mary Garvey Algero, A Step in the Right Direction: Reducing Intercircuit
Conflicts by Strengthening the Value of Federal Appellate Court Decisions, 70 TENN. L.
REV. 605, 615 (2003).
2
See Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91
CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1459-60 (2003); Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The
Need for a New National Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1405-07 (1987).
3
See Algero, supra note 1, at 606, 613; Baker & McFarland, supra note 2, at 1406.
4
See Algero, supra note 1, at 614-615.
5
See id. at 616-17.
6
See id. at 608-09; see also Baker & McFarland, supra note 2, at 1407.
7
See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 510 (7th Cir. 2004).
8
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, (2000).
9
Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, (2004).
10
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
11
See, e.g., Booker, 374 F.3d at 516 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)
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In Apprendi, the Court dealt with the constitutionality of a New
Jersey sentencing practice and created the rule from which both Blakely
and Booker drew.12 This rule stated that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.”13 This decision invalidated a sentence
imposed upon a white defendant who had pled guilty to charges after
firing shots into his African-American neighbor’s home.14 The sentence
was unconstitutional because it had been enhanced pursuant to New
Jersey’s hate crime law, which allowed judges to add jail time where
they found by a preponderance of the evidence, that the accused had
“acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals
because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or
ethnicity.”15 The statute, the Court held in articulating its rule, infringed
upon the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to have a jury decide the
facts necessary to increase his sentence on a reasonable doubt standard.16
After Apprendi, the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(hereinafter “the Guidelines”) could have been called into serious
question, but the circuits uniformly upheld them as constitutional, and
generally interpreted the Supreme Court’s ruling as identifying a Sixth
Amendment problem only when a judge’s own findings enhanced a
defendant’s sentence such that the sentence exceeded the crime’s
statutorily provided maximum sentence.17 Consequently, there were no
Sixth Amendment problems where judges made Guidelines
enhancements that produced sentences remaining within the crime’s
statutory maximum.18
This interpretation was prevalent until the Court’s follow up case of
Blakely v. Washington, issued four years later, created serious concerns
about the constitutionality of the Guidelines.19 In Blakely, the court
clarified the intricacies of the Apprendi rule, holding that: “the relevant
‘statutory maximum’ [under the Apprendi rule] is not the maximum
12

See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469; Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536; Booker, 125 S. Ct. at

749.

13

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
Id. at 469-70.
15
Id. at 468-70 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 2000)).
16
Id. at 490.
17
See generally Frank Bowman, Train Wreck? Or Can the Federal Sentencing
System be Saved? A Plea for Rapid Reversal of Blakely v. Washington, 41 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 217, 220 (2004). See also United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir.
2004); United States v. Mincey, 380 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2004).
18
See, e.g., United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 348 (4th Cir. 2004).
19
See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2549-50 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
14
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sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the
maximum he may impose without any additional findings.”20 Under this
rule, Blakely, who had pleaded guilty to a kidnapping crime which
carried a statutory maximum ten year sentence, had been sentenced
unconstitutionally.21 Blakely’s plea had included admissions of facts
which exposed him to a presumptive maximum sentence of fifty-three
months.22 The sentencing judge, however, found by a preponderance of
the evidence that Blakely’s actions showed “deliberate cruelty,” a finding
that permitted a sentencing departure under the state’s statute.23 Based on
this departure authority, the judge sentenced Blakely to ninety months in
prison. 24
Applying the rule of Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that a
sentencing scheme that allowed for this type of enhancement based on a
judge’s findings was unconstitutional.25 Even though the kidnapping
statute prescribed a maximum sentence of ten years, Blakely’s maximum
for Sixth Amendment purposes was the fifty-three months he faced based
on his admissions—anything raising his sentence beyond that should
have been presented to a jury and decided beyond a reasonable doubt.26
This formulation of the Apprendi rule suddenly called into question
the sentencing methods used under the Guidelines.27 As noted above, the
circuit courts had previously rejected Apprendi-based challenges to the
judicial practice under the Guidelines of using a preponderance of the
evidence standard to find facts for sentence enhancements.28 The Blakely
dissents observed that the majority’s expansion of the Apprendi notion of
the “statutory maximum” would inevitably affect these federal
sentencing practices.29 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Blakely,
was, however, clear that the Court’s application of Apprendi addressed
only the specifics of the Washington state sentencing scheme.30 Justice
Scalia’s reference to the Guidelines was clear and assertive: “The Federal
Guidelines are not before us, and we express no opinion on them.”31
This straightforward observation did not, of course, relieve the
circuit courts of the continuing obligation to address the Sixth
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537 (emphasis in the original).
Id. at 2534.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2535.
Id. at 2534, 2537-38.
Id. at 2537.
Id. at 2549-50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
See United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 348 (4th Cir. 2004).
See, e.g., Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2549-50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2539 n.9.
Id.
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Amendment problems in the Guideline’s sentencing practices, and to do
so in light of Blakely’s reasoning.32 As the Fifth Circuit noted in Pineiro,
Justice Scalia’s observation that Blakely did not include any opinions on
the Guidelines “does not by itself mean that Blakely carries no import for
the federal Guidelines, for the binding force of a Supreme Court decision
is ordinarily not limited to the particular set of facts that produces it.”33
As a result, petitions for certiorari regarding Blakely’s application to the
Guidelines began to pour into the Supreme Court, and the Court
ultimately granted certiorari on two cases: United States v. Booker, out of
the Seventh Circuit,34 and United States v. Fanfan, a district court case
from the District of Maine, which was expedited through the First
Circuit.35
The Booker and Fanfan decisions were consolidated by the
Supreme Court in the form of United States v. Booker, which
affirmatively declared that “there is no distinction of constitutional
significance between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
Washington procedures at issue in [Blakely].”36 In answering the
concerns of the circuit courts about the constitutionality of the
Guidelines, the Booker decision produced two majority opinions: the
first, by Justice Stevens, held that the principles set forth in Apprendi and
Blakely rendered the Guidelines unconstitutional,37 and the second, by
Justice Breyer, detailing a remedial scheme for the district and circuit
courts to follow.38 The remedial scheme severed two sections of the
Guidelines, and had the effect of making the Guidelines “advisory” in
their entirety.39
This comment addresses the reactions and the effectiveness of the
circuit courts during the period between Blakely and Booker. In that
interim, a circuit split over the application of Blakely to the Guidelines
developed rapidly—within only three weeks of the Blakely decision.40
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits decided that Blakely did not affect the

32

See United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 513 (7th Cir. 2004).
United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464, 469 (5th Cir. 2004).
34
Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004).
35
United States v. Fanfan, No. 03-47, 2004 WL 1723114 (D. Me. June 28, 2004).
The Supreme Court accepted a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment to hear
this case.
36
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 749 (2005).
37
See id. at 746.
38
See id. at 756.
39
See id. at 756-57.
40
GORDON MEHLER, JOHN GLEESON & DAVID C. JAMES, FEDERAL CRIMINAL
PRACTICE: A SECOND CIRCUIT HANDBOOK 677 (LexisNexis 2004 ed.).
33
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Guidelines,41 with the Fourth Circuit carefully advising district court
judges to use the Guidelines, but also “announce, at the time of
sentencing, a sentence . . . treating the guidelines as advisory only.”42
The Second Circuit ultimately reached virtually the same result,43 but it
first took the unusual and particularly cautious route of certifying
questions to the Supreme Court regarding the constitutional viability of
the Guidelines.44 Two circuits, the Sixth and the Eighth, initially held
that Blakely was applicable to the Guidelines and created new sentencing
procedures for district court judges.45 Both courts retreated from these
initial approaches, however, with the Sixth Circuit vacating its opinion a
mere five days later and the Eighth Circuit doing so four days after
certiorari was granted in Booker.46
Of the remaining circuits, only the Seventh and the Ninth held that
Blakely’s reasoning implied constitutional problems for the Guidelines.47
Although the Supreme Court would ultimately hold that this was the
correct interpretation of Blakely,48 it was not a “safe” decision for a
circuit court to make, considering that the Supreme Court had previously
upheld the Guidelines in the face of constitutional challenges.49 Still, as
Judge Richard Posner observed: “The majority in Blakely, faced with
dissenting opinions that as much as said that the decision doomed the
federal sentencing guidelines, might have said no, it doesn’t; it did not
say that.”50 Applying Blakely to the Guidelines, risky though it might
have been, was a constitutional necessity for the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits.51
Analysis of the post-Blakely circuit split shows that, when faced
with a constitutional question that had not been directly addressed by the
41
See United States v. Hammoud, 378 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464, 473 (5th Cir. 2004).
42
Hammoud, 378 F.3d at 426.
43
See United States v. Mincey, 380 F.3d 102, 103 (2d Cir. 2004).
44
See United States v. Penaranda, 375 F.3d 238, 240 (2d Cir. 2004).
45
See United States v. Montgomery, No. 03-5256, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14384, at
*8-10 (6th Cir. July 14, 2004), vacated by No. 03-5256, 2004 WL 1562904 (6th Cir. July
19, 2004), dismissed by No. 03-5256, 2004 WL 1637660 (6th Cir. July 23, 2004); United
States v. Mooney, No. 02-3388, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 15301, at *39 (8th Cir. July 23,
2004), vacated by No. 02-3388, 2004 WL 1636960 (8th Cir. July 27, 2004).
46
See Montgomery, No. 03-5256, 2004 WL 1562904; Mooney, No. 02-3388, 2004
WL 1636960.
47
See United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 513 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Ameline, 376 F.3d 967, 974 (9th Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Fanfan, No. 03-47,
2004 WL 1723114, at *3 (D. Me. June 28, 2004).
48
See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 749 (2005).
49
See, e.g., United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464, 470-71 (5th Cir. 2004).
50
Booker, 375 F.3d at 511.
51
See Booker, 375 F.3d at 513, Ameline, 376 F.3d at 974.
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Supreme Court, and had the potential to dramatically affect the
sentencing of criminal defendants, the circuit courts overall took the
especially safe route of upholding the Guidelines, particularly after the
Court granted certiorari on the issue.52 The circuits that fell on the other
side of the split and decided to apply Blakely to the Guidelines better
served their district courts. However, they also faced an additional
question of how to direct sentencing judges—a question which, the
Second Circuit noted, would have to be made without guidance from the
Court.53 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits, for example, addressed the
congressional intent and severance issues that the Court would consider
in its Booker opinion.54 Overall, these circuits performed their role as
conduit and guide well, offering sentencing options that both involved an
admirable amount of risk-taking given the Court’s expressed concerns in
Blakely, and were wisely executed, particularly where they were
cautiously cushioned by options such as alternative non-Guidelines
sentences.55
The first part of this comment will address the Supreme Court’s
treatment of the Washington state sentencing scheme in Blakely,
highlighting the rule established by the case and its relationship with the
holding of Apprendi. This section will also address the severity of the
choice imposed upon the federal courts as post-Apprendi sentencing
practices surfaced tenuously in the wake of the Blakely decision.56 This
severity is well illustrated by the Second Circuit’s decision in
Penaranda, which will be examined closely.57
The second part of this comment will provide an analysis of the
circuit split that resulted from concerns such as those expressed by the
Penaranda court. It will also follow the remedial decisions made by the
circuits that applied Blakely’s reasoning to strike down the Guidelines.
The third part of this comment will discuss the much anticipated
outcome of the Supreme Court’s expedited decision in Booker and
Fanfan. The final part will analyze the effectiveness of the circuit courts
during the time between Blakely and Booker. With the fate of so many
criminal defendants at issue, this time period presented the circuit courts
with a unique situation in which the solutions and remedies so
desperately required by sentencing judges were uncertain at best and
virtually unattainable at worst.58 Overall, the circuits’ conservative
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

See, e.g., United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2004).
Penaranda, 375 F.3d at 246.
Booker, 375 F.3d at 514-15; Ameline, 376 F.3d at 981.
See, e.g., Booker, 375 F.3d at 514-15.
See Penaranda, 375 F.3d at 246.
Id.
See, e.g., Penaranda, 375 F.3d at 246
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reactions are understandable and illustrate an adequate attempt to guide
district courts while indirectly maintaining some semblance of
uniformity among the circuits. Meanwhile, those circuits that balanced
the risk-taking step of applying Blakely to the Guidelines with
conservative remedial sentencing procedures best fulfilled the
institutional role of intermediary between the Supreme Court and the
district courts.
II. BLAKELY V. WASHINGTON AND ITS IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH—THE
SUPREME COURT LAUNCHES THE DEBATE
A. The Blakely Decision
Blakely examined the Washington State sentencing guidelines
only—a fact made clear by Justice Scalia in his opinion for the Court.59
Blakely’s sentence was governed not only by the statute defining the
offense and creating a punishment range for it, but also by the
Washington State Sentencing Reform Act.60 In particular, the Court was
called upon to examine two aspects of the Act.61 Essentially, as the
Blakely Court explained, the Washington Act prescribed “standard
ranges” for violations, but it allowed sentencing judges to add to those
ranges upon a finding of “‘substantial and compelling reasons justifying
an exceptional sentence.’”62 A justification could come from the Act
itself—which offered an “illustrative rather than exhaustive” list of
“aggravating factors” a judge could rely upon63—provided the judge
“set[s] forth findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting it.”64 In
explaining this enhancement process, the Blakely Court focused in
particular on the following limitation of Washington state law: when a
judge sought to add to a standard sentencing range, “‘[a] reason offered
to justify an exceptional sentence can be considered only if it takes into
account factors other than those which are used in computing the
standard range sentence for the offense.’”65
This “additional factors” notion was particularly important given
the specifics of defendant Ralph Howard Blakely’s case. In his case,
Blakely agreed to plead guilty to a number of facts surrounding an
59

Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2538 n.9 (2004).
Id. at 2535.
Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §9.94A.320).
62
Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN §9.94A.120(2)).
63
Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN §9.94A.390).
64
Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN §9.94A.120(3)).
65
Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2535 (2004) (citing State v. Gore, 21 P.3d
262, 277 (Wash. 2001)).
60
61
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incident in which he kidnapped his wife at knifepoint after she attempted
to divorce him.66 The admissions made him guilty of “second-degree
kidnapping involving domestic violence and use of a firearm.”67 The
state law statutory maximum for this offense, categorized as a “class B
felony,” was ten years, and the standard range under the Washington
Sentencing Reform Act for the specifics of Blakely’s admission was
forty-nine to fifty-three months.68 Though the prosecutor had asked that
Blakely be sentenced within that forty-nine to fifty-three month range,
the judge ended up sentencing the defendant to ninety months “on the
ground that [Blakely] had acted with ‘deliberate cruelty,’ a statutorily
enumerated ground for departure in domestic-violence cases.”69 A
hearing was held after the defendant objected and the judge ultimately
made thirty-two findings of fact regarding the kidnapping ordeal.70 The
ninety-month sentence stood.71
In determining that Blakely’s Sixth Amendment rights had been
violated by this sentencing process, the Court made use of Apprendi.72
The Apprendi rule, which was the result of a detailed, historical analysis
that chronicled the relevant Supreme Court case law, made crucial the
role of the jury in defining a defendant’s maximum punishment and set
forth a required standard of proof: “Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.”73 The Blakely Court referenced the common
law tradition of the Apprendi rule to explain its continuing relevance and
importance to the case at bar.74 Applying the Apprendi rule, however,
required some clarification.
The government had argued that the Apprendi “statutory
maximum” for defendant Blakely was the ten years that the Washington
statute had placed as the upper limit for class B felonies.75 Under this
formulation of the Apprendi rule, Blakely would lose the argument that
66

Id. at 2534.
Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN §§ 9A.40.030(1), 10.99.020(3)(p), 9.94A.125).
See id. at 2535.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 2535-36.
71
Id. at 2536.
72
Id.
73
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
74
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 343 (1769) and 1 J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 87 (2d ed. 1872)
for the proposition that defendant has a right to have the “truth of every accusation”
against him determined by a jury of his peers and that if a fact is not determined by a
jury, then the accusation “is no accusation in reason.”).
75
Id. at 2537.
67
68
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his Sixth Amendment rights had been violated, for though judicial
findings led to the ninety-month sentence, ninety months is still less than
ten years.76 Blakely would not have been deprived of his right to have
facts essential to his sentence determined by a jury because Apprendi
would require only that a jury find facts that enhance a sentence past ten
years.77 The Court disposed of this argument swiftly by clarifying the
phrase “statutory maximum.”78 The Court held that ten years was not the
“statutory maximum” because “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi
purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant.’”79 In Blakely’s case, the Court explained, the “statutory
maximum” was fifty-three months because that was the most Blakely
could have been sentenced, based on the facts he admitted in his plea
bargain agreement.80 The Court continued to explain that ninety months
was an “exceptional” sentence notwithstanding the ten-year maximum
for class B felonies, for “[h]ad the judge imposed the 90-month sentence
solely on the basis of the plea, he would have been reversed.”81 The
ninety months could be justified under the Washington Sentencing
Reform Act only if the judge could show an admission of the “additional
factors” explained above, and here there were no real “additional factors”
available.82 Consequently, the Court held that Blakely’s ninety-month
sentence was unconstitutional.83
The majority opinion called this clarification of the Apprendi rule a
“commitment to Apprendi in this context” that was necessary and
“reflects not just respect for longstanding precedent, but the need to give
intelligible content to the right of jury trial.”84
B. The Dissenting Opinions
The dissenting opinions voiced great concern regarding the
ramifications of this use of Apprendi. In a particularly forceful
interpretation, Justice O’Connor described the majority’s holding as “a
rigid rule that destroys everything in its path.”85 The Justice addressed
the practical consequences of the majority decision, chastising the Court
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 2537-38.
Id. at 2538.
Id. at 2537.
Id. at 2538.
Id.
Id. at 2547 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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for “ignor[ing] the havoc it is about to wreak on trial courts across the
country.”86 Importantly for the circuit courts, Justice O’Connor broached
the issue of the Guidelines which had been side-stepped by the
majority.87 Justice O’Connor stated that “[i]t is no answer to say that
today’s opinion impacts only Washington’s scheme and not others, such
as, for example, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.”88 The Justice then
answered a few arguments that the circuit courts would be forced to take
up and decide in the intervening months before the Court issued
Booker.89 Specifically, Justice O’Connor concluded that the fact that the
Guidelines were promulgated by the Sentencing Commission (an
administrative agency), as opposed to a legislature, was “irrelevant to the
majority’s reasoning.”90 Regardless of the method by which the
Guidelines came into being, they “have the force of law,” and,
consequently, the Blakely decision may apply to them as well.91
Justice O’Connor also highlighted the structural similarities
between the Guidelines and the Washington sentencing scheme, noting
that “the structural differences that do exist make the Federal Guidelines
more vulnerable to attack.”92 In particular, the Justice discussed the “soft
constraints” of the Washington scheme, which the majority held to be in
violation of Apprendi.93 These “soft constraints” included the ability to
upwardly depart based on “substantial and compelling reasons” by using
the “nonexhaustive list of aggravating factors” detailed in the treatment
of the majority opinion above.94 Justice O’Connor observed that if these
constraints could not exist under Apprendi, then the “hard constraints” of
the Guidelines, “which require an increase in the sentencing range upon
specified factual findings, will meet the same fate.”95
In another dissent, Justice Breyer echoed this concern of releasing
the Blakely opinion with only Justice Scalia’s footnote to guide the
federal courts as to the application of Blakely to the Guidelines.96 After
expressing doubt that the Guidelines could be distinguished from the
Washington scheme, the Justice warned that “[f]ederal prosecutors will

86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Id. at 2549 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2549-50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2549 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2550 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id. at 2549-50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2550 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id. at 2561 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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proceed with those prosecutions subject to the risk that all defendants in
those cases will have to be sentenced, perhaps tried, anew.”97
Justice Breyer’s dissent mostly addressed the possible sentencing
approaches available to legislatures after Blakely.98 The Justice’s third
such approach, that legislatures would try to keep “structured schemes
that attempt to punish similar conduct similarly and different conduct
differently, but modify[] them to conform to Apprendi’s dictates”99—
would echo through circuit court opinions during the period between
Blakely and Booker.100 In particular, Justice Breyer presented and
criticized the option of using a “sentencing jury” to “make sentencing
guidelines Apprendi-compliant[.]”101 A sentencing jury would convene
after a conviction to “try the disputed facts that, if found, would
aggravate the sentence.”102 A major problem with the sentencing jury
approach, the Justice explained, is that it leaves unanswered the question
of what happens to defendants who plead guilty103—a situation which
would present itself in many of the post-Blakely appeals to the circuits.104
The approach empowers the prosecutor in the plea bargain context, by
allowing her to essentially control the ultimate sentence by choosing
which elements to charge in the indictment.105 Requiring a jury
determination of these elements removes the Judge’s opportunity to
consider them for sentencing purposes.106 As a result, in the plea bargain
context, they may never be considered, for defendants might think it
wiser to just plead guilty.107 Making such a choice “would undercut, if
not nullify, legislative efforts to ensure through guidelines that
punishments reflect a convicted offender’s real criminal conduct, rather
than that portion of the offender’s conduct that a prosecutor decides to
charge and prove.”108
Justice Breyer dissented because so many questions were left open
for the federal courts: “Given this consequence and the need for
certainty, I would not proceed further piecemeal; rather, I would call for
further argument on the ramifications of the concerns I have raised.”109
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

Id. at 2561-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2552-54 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2554 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 514-15 (7th Cir. 2004).
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2556 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Unfortunately for the federal courts, as Justice Breyer noted, “that is not
the Court’s view.”110 So, with the issuance of the Blakely opinion, each
district court found itself required to determine the state of the
Guidelines.
C. The Immediate Aftermath: The Hectic Post-Blakely Atmosphere.
Justices O’Connor and Breyer’s broader concerns about the chaotic
post-Blakely environment in the federal courts proved to be wellfounded. News coverage spoke of the “turmoil that has gripped federal
courts nationwide since the Supreme Court ruled [on Blakely]”111 and
legal articles offering guidance to practitioners began to surface.112 With
criminal defendants awaiting sentencing, an overall sense of urgency
developed in the district courts as judges attempted to decipher the
meaning of Blakely and its dissents.113 Judge D. Brock Hornby, of the
District of Maine, addressed such a concern at a hearing for defendant
Duncan Fanfan, who had been awaiting sentencing for almost eight
months: “I am not going to await further briefing, it would be I think
unfair to this defendant at this point to continue to delay his sentence.”114
The judge expressed a thought likely running through the minds of many
district judges in this predicament: “[M]y obligation is to go ahead and
do the best I can with the Supreme Court decision . . . [s]o I’m going to
go ahead and rule based upon my understanding of what the Blakely
decision means.”115 Judge Hornby applied Blakely to the Guidelines and,
consequently, did not enhance Fanfan’s sentence based on any additional
findings.116 Certiorari would later be granted in Fanfan’s case by the
Supreme Court.117
With the district courts in disarray over the application of Blakely to
the Guidelines, circuit courts soon began to tackle the issue. The policy
concerns facing the circuits were perhaps best expressed by the Second
Circuit in Penaranda.118 The opinion illustrates the atmosphere of the
110
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time period between Blakely and Booker—an atmosphere in which the
answer to the constitutional question was arguably just as important as
the need for the circuits to define a role for themselves, one that would
balance the duty to defer to Supreme Court precedent with the desire to
act as a guide for the district courts.119 To reconcile these goals, the
Second Circuit attempted to reach the Supreme Court with a device it
had not used in twenty-three years.120 In an en banc opinion, the court
made the unanimous decision to certify to the Supreme Court three
questions regarding the application of Blakely to the Guidelines.121
Before the Second Circuit were two appeals from sentences for drug
convictions.122 Acknowledging that the Supreme Court had asked the
circuit courts to reserve the certification option for extreme situations,
the Second Circuit used the circumstances surrounding the sentencings
of defendants Hector Penaranda and Luis Rojas to illustrate the severity
of the choice facing the federal courts after Blakely.123
The two sentences at issue in Peneranda presented ideal examples
of how crucial it was for circuit courts to offer immediate guidance to the
district courts, because application of Blakely to the Guidelines could
significantly change the amount of jail time a defendant faces.124 For
example, a jury found Penaranda guilty of possessing five or more
kilograms of cocaine and one or more kilogram of heroin; however, he
was ultimately sentenced for “at least twenty kilograms of cocaine and at
least 1,200 grams of heroin.”125 The discrepancy in quantities was
substantial, to say the least. The facts of the second case, concerning
defendant Rojas, present the potential benefits of Blakely for defendants
who choose to plead guilty.126 Rojas did not enter into a plea bargain
when he admitted to conspiracy to distribute cocaine in the amount of
“five kilograms or more” and his defense counsel had attempted to argue
that Rojas’s admission was not specific enough to warrant more than
twenty years in jail, the statutory maximum which applies “where the
jury has failed to make specific findings concerning quantity.”127 Having
lost that argument before the sentencing judge, Rojas entered the
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sentencing hearing to have the judge determine a base level offense, and
ultimately ended up with thirty years in jail.128
Examining Blakely’s analysis and reformulation of the Apprendi
“relevant ‘statutory maximum’” rule, the Second Circuit used the
Penaranda opinion to note the possibility that Blakely similarly applied
to the Guidelines.129 With “reasonable arguments” on both sides, the
circuit found that the sentences could be invalid, but it could not be
certain whether a majority of the Supreme Court would extend the
reasoning of Blakely to these cases.130 The uncertainty was not just a
narrow one, pertaining to a limited number of cases, the Second Circuit
continued, but involved a choice that would have far-reaching
ramifications and required more guidance from the Supreme Court
before the circuit courts could properly act in their roles as conduit for
the Court and as adviser to the district courts.131 This was so because, in
particular, Blakely “raises the prospect that many thousands of future
sentences may be invalidated or, alternatively, that district courts simply
will halt sentencing altogether pending a definitive ruling by the
Supreme Court.”132 Without further input from the Court, the federal
courts would inevitably be involved in a situation where “defendants,
victims, and the public will be left uncertain as to what sentences are
lawful” by making a choice as to how to proceed and by issuing
sentences based on that choice.133 Whether choosing to apply Blakely and
to pick a new method of sentencing or proceeding as usual with
sentencing hearings, the circuits must know that “[w]hichever conclusion
turns out to be incorrect, and one of them will, thousands of cases soon
will be adversely affected.”134
Based on these practical and policy concerns, the Second Circuit
certified its three questions to the Supreme Court—one regarding the
application of Blakely to a judge’s ability to determine and depart from
offense levels under the guidelines, and the other two specific to the
circumstances of Penaranda’s and Rojas’s cases.135 This approach was
unique to the circuits, and while it provided no substantive answers to the
Blakely issue, it nicely framed the context of the Blakely-application
inquiry and illustrated the post-Blakely atmosphere by asking the
Supreme Court to address the circuits “in order to minimize, to the extent
128
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possible, what [the Second Circuit sees] as an impending crisis in the
administration of criminal justice in the federal courts.”136
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT & PROPOSED SENTENCING REMEDIES
Given the situation identified by the court in Peneranda, it was
crucial that the circuit courts act immediately.137 Their role in this
situation, to channel the intent of the Supreme Court in Blakely and pass
it to the district courts as it guided them towards constitutional
sentencing practices,138 expressed itself with differing results as the
circuits began to split on the threshold issue of applying Blakely.
A. Refusing to Apply Blakely’s Reasoning to the Guidelines—The Fifth,
Second and Fourth Circuits
The Fifth, Second and Fourth Circuits acted on the conservative
side of this circuit split, refusing to extend Blakely to the Guidelines. The
Fifth Circuit was the first to uphold the Guidelines in Pineiro.139 After
identifying its “role as an intermediate appellate court,” the circuit
cautiously began to fulfill it.140 First, the court set the standard for
reviewing a Supreme Court decision, holding that it would not “depart
from settled law in the absence of an on-point en banc or Supreme Court
holding.”141 Next, it analyzed the Supreme Court precedent on
sentencing, identifying a series of cases upholding the Guidelines against
various constitutional challenges.142 It appeared the circuit court believed
that, given this precedent, the Supreme Court would continue to uphold
the constitutionality of the Guidelines in the face of a Sixth Amendment
challenge.143 Under Piniero, sentencing would continue as it had postApprendi, and the applicable “statutory maximum” would continue in the
Fifth Circuit to be the maximum provided by the United States Code,
making judicial enhancements under the Guidelines permissible as long
as they stayed within that limit.144 Holding otherwise, the circuit noted
that it “would not directly ‘overrule’ any Supreme Court holding—a
prerogative reserved unto the Court itself—but it would plainly create an
136
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unsettling tension with them.”145 Consequently, the circuit found it wiser
to follow a more conservative approach of maintaining current
sentencing practices until instructed otherwise by the Supreme Court.146
The Second Circuit was less forthright in its decision to steer clear
of an application of Blakely to the Guidelines. As discussed above, it had
certified questions to the Supreme Court in Penaranda,147 but days after
the Court granted certiorari in Booker and Fanfan, the Second Circuit
issued United States v. Mincey, which directed district courts to disregard
Blakely issues and to continue to sentence according to the post-Apprendi
circuit precedent.148 With this instruction, the Second Circuit fell in line
with the Fifth, noting that Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area
seemed to support the use of the Guidelines.149 The court also cited
Justice Scalia’s refusal to address the Guidelines as a justification for
keeping its sentencing practices in place.150 Ultimately, however, the
Second Circuit’s carefully-plotted approach to this issue seemed to be
contingent upon the Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari and an
expedited schedule for Booker and Fanfan.151 Since “we can expect to be
advised soon in the event that the Supreme Court intends to apply
Blakely to the Guidelines,” the court would not risk applying Blakely
itself and fashioning tenuous remedial sentencing provisions.152
The Fourth Circuit, which issued its ruling on the Blakely issue on
the same day that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Booker and
Fanfan, adopted the most guarded approach of the three circuits on this
side of the split.153 The Fourth Circuit first issued a brief order, finding
that Blakely did not affect sentencing under the Guidelines and directing
Fourth Circuit district courts to issue a secondary sentence, using the
Guidelines merely as an advisory tool.154 The order was followed
roughly a month later by a lengthy opinion, United States v. Hammoud,
which explained the reasons behind the direction to announce an
alternative, “advisory” sentence.155
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The Hammoud court first began by clarifying the court’s decision to
hold that Blakely did not affect the Guidelines by siding with the Fifth
and Second Circuits and focusing on the Supreme Court’s prior treatment
of the Guidelines.156 The court also implied, however, that the circuits
falling on the other side of this split would have been wiser “to account
for the factual and legal context in which Blakely was decided.”157 This
context showed that Blakely did not change the Apprendi rule, the Fourth
Circuit held; it merely applied Apprendi to a different type of sentencing
scheme—one where two legislative enactments (the Washington State
statute defining the crimes and the Washington State Sentencing Reform
Act, imposing more limits on sentencing)158 existed to affect
sentencing.159 The Guidelines, by contrast, were promulgated by the
Sentencing Commission, so the upper end of the range prescribed in a
particular case was not the relevant “statutory maximum” for Apprendi
purposes.160 Instead, the relevant maximum sentence remained the one
imposed by statute.161
The carefully crafted opinion in Hammoud shows great deference to
Supreme Court precedent, and its cautious character is emphasized by
the Fourth Circuit’s recommendation that judges announce a nonGuidelines alternative sentence.162 This alternative sentence would use
the Guidelines as an advisory tool, in case the Supreme Court found the
Guidelines to violate the Sixth Amendment.163 The court explained that
the purpose of having district judges declare a non-Guidelines sentence
was to “serve judicial economy.”164 Taking away the Guidelines would,
obviously, change the sentencing process. The court observed that judges
might have “to consider issues not generally pertinent in guidelines
sentencing.”165 Though it was not specific about what these “issues”
might be, the court was certain that the additional inquiries would take
more time.166 Consequently, it was best, in the event Blakely was
ultimately found to apply to the Guidelines, to have district court judges
create the advisory sentence, “at a time when the facts and circumstances
[of each case] were clearly in mind.”167
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Announcing the non-Guidelines sentencing would not completely
solve the problem if Blakely applied.168 Procedurally, another hearing
might be necessary to impose the non-Guidelines sentence.169 However,
having announced such a sentence already, “the district court and the
parties will need to spend far less time preparing because the issues will
already have been resolved.”170 The threat of “wasted effort”
notwithstanding, the Fourth Circuit was covering all of its bases.171
B. Applying Blakely Only to Vacate That Decision & Its Proposed
Remedies—The Sixth & Eighth Circuits.
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits began their confrontation of the
Blakely issue with bold decisions invalidating the Guidelines and
proposing risky remedies. The Sixth Circuit struck first with United
States v. Montgomery, which held that the Blakely reasoning applied to
the Guidelines and, consequently, a Sixth Amendment issue could only
be avoided if the sentencing judge used them as advisory and calculated
a sentence within the statutorily prescribed range.172 This decision was
vacated a mere five days later—a wise move by the Sixth Circuit
considering the questionable reasoning behind the Montgomery
holding.173
At first glance, Montgomery seems slightly prescient in choosing to
delve a bit into the legislative history, which Justice Breyer would come
to consult at length in the remedial opinion of Booker.174 The Sixth
Circuit held that the “mandatory system” of the Guidelines could not
stand under Blakely, instead, “[t]he ‘guidelines’ will become simply
recommendations that the judge should seriously consider but may
disregard when she believes that a different sentence is called for.”175
The court expressed its confidence in issuing this instruction by drawing
briefly on the language of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, explaining
that the Act “does not by its terms require a mandatory, rule-bound
system calibrating sentences to judicially-found facts.”176 Instead, the
court interpreted § 3553(a) to require that the court consider the
168
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guidelines in addition to a large group of other factors.177 Section
3553(b)—which the Booker court would ultimately interpret as making
the Guidelines mandatory178—was noted by Montgomery only for its
allowance that district judges should look at “the ‘aggravating or
mitigating circumstances’ of the particular case” in order to give a
sentence outside of the Guidelines.179 Indeed, according to the Sixth
Circuit, it was the Sentencing Commission, not Congress, that viewed
the statute as making the Guidelines mandatory.180 Consequently, the
Sixth Circuit simply counseled the district courts to treat the Guidelines
as advisory.181 Sentencing judges were instructed to “view the guidelines
in general as recommendations to be considered and then applied only if
the judge believes they are appropriate and in the interests of justice in
the particular case.”182
This interpretation of the law turned out to be incorrect.183 The
Guidelines were found by the Booker Court to have an actual mandatory
effect that was intended by Congress, and those mandatory provisions
needed to be severed before the Guidelines could be used as advisory.184
In argument, the Sixth Circuit vacated Montgomery and issued new
guidance in Koch.185 Koch found Blakely inapplicable and ordered the
district court judges to continue sentencing according to the
Guidelines.186 The case reasserted the Sixth Circuit’s position on
Supreme Court precedent regarding sentencing, noting that it had always
upheld enhancements under the Guidelines “so long as the resulting
sentence falls below the congressionally-prescribed statutory
maximum.”187
Koch also relied upon the argument (dismissed in dissent in Blakely
by Justice O’Connor)188 that the Guidelines are “agency-promulgated”
and not legislatively enacted statutes.189 Regardless of the ultimate
importance of this distinction, the court asserted: “the difference is
enough to counsel restraint on the part of a lower court asked to
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invalidate the entire regime.”190 Finally, the Sixth Circuit noted that
“only a master tailor could invalidate the Guidelines without unraveling
the fabric of [] other rulings” that gave judges discretion to make
findings of fact and allowed legislatures to distinguish between
sentencing “factors,” which do not have to be decided by a jury, and
“elements,” which must be put forth in the indictment.191 The Circuit
refused to perform this role of “master tailor,” choosing instead to play a
traditional part, refusing activism by vacating Montgomery to await
guidance from the Supreme Court.192
The Eighth Circuit, meanwhile, took perhaps the biggest risk of all
of the circuits by interpreting Blakely as rendering the Guidelines
“wholly unconstitutional” and directing sentencing judges to use them as
advisory, unless a defendant agreed to a Guidelines sentence.193 The
opinion, United States v. Mooney, was short, choosing to adopt this
remedy from District Judge Paul Cassell in the District of Utah.194 In
choosing its route, the Eighth Circuit issued the boldest opinion of all the
circuits, finding the Guidelines to be unconstitutional beyond repair—
severance, addressed by other circuits and ultimately adopted by the
Supreme Court in Booker, simply was not an option.195 The Guidelines
would be advisory to give sentencing judges some sense of how to
sentence with the broad statutory ranges, but the Sixth Amendment
violation was too pervasive to uphold the Guidelines in any form.196
Since it was the most extreme opinion, it is perhaps not surprising
that the Eighth Circuit vacated Mooney four days after the Supreme
Court granted certiorari on Booker and Fanfan.197 The circuit did not
issue another opinion offering interim instruction, instead stepping back
entirely from its bold move in Mooney.
C. Applying Blakely to the Guidelines—The Seventh & Ninth Circuits
With the retreat of the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, only the Seventh
and Ninth remained to apply Blakely reasoning to the Guidelines and
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find a Sixth Amendment violation that required remedial opinions.198 In
these circuits, the traditional circuit role of enforcer of Supreme Court
interpretation of law was in obvious tension with the additional role of
instructor, attempting to control potential disarray among the circuit
courts.199
The most significant entry from the First Circuit came from one of
its district courts, the District of Maine.200 It was Fanfan itself, a
sentencing that was accepted for direct appeal to the Supreme Court.201
District Judge D. Brock Hornby articulated the institutional importance
of the traditional roles of each level of the federal courts in this context,
declaring: “I conclude that perhaps the Supreme Court can find a way to
explain away Blakely in its language and its reasoning, but as a trial
Judge and a sentencing Judge, I cannot.”202 In light of the reality of
placement within the federal structure, and having taken enough of a leap
in finding the Blakely reasoning applicable to the Guidelines, the Judge
refused to go further, choosing the most conservative remedial method
available,203 using only the information available from the jury’s finding
and declining to depart from that determination.204 While Judge Hornby
explained that he was capable of making additional findings that would
increase defendant Fanfan’s sentence, to do so on a preponderance of the
evidence standard would, in the post-Blakely world, constitute a Sixth
Amendment violation.205 With this conservative approach, the court
noted, “I will leave it to higher courts to tell me [Blakely] does not mean
exactly what it says.”206 This call to the circuit courts underscores the
importance of their role as instructor—a role which would be taken up by
the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Booker.207
By deciding that Blakely created constitutional problems with the
application of the Guidelines, the Seventh Circuit in Booker spent time
orienting itself within the federal structure and justifying its authority to
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interpret the constitutional issue at hand.208 The circuit began by noting
its reasons for addressing the Blakely issue in an expedited decision and
by invoking its role as instructor.209 The district courts, the Seventh
Circuit noted, needed guidance for “an avalanche of motions for
resentencing in the light of Blakely. . .” and while instruction could not
be “definitive,” the circuit court noted, “our hope is that an early opinion
will help speed the issue to a definitive resolution” by the Supreme Court
or, alternatively, by Congress.210 The court thereby established its role in
the post-Blakely context as including the duty not only to instruct the
district courts on rules of the Supreme Court case law, but also to speak
on behalf of the district courts, using the Booker opinion to get a faster
answer from the Court.211
The Seventh Circuit then set the stage for the gamble it would take
by finding Sixth Amendment difficulties with the Guidelines. First, the
circuit court recognized its inability to overrule a Supreme Court ruling
“even if it seems manifestly inconsistent with a subsequent decision,
unless the subsequent decision explicitly overruled the earlier one.”212
The circuit justified its decision to take the Blakely reasoning from the
Washington State scheme to the arena of the Guidelines, however, by
highlighting the Supreme Court’s refusal to explicitly address the
potential Sixth Amendment challenge to the Guidelines.213 Under such
circumstances, the court held, the Supreme Court “perforce confides the
issue to the lower federal courts for the first pass at the resolution.”214
Comfortable in its ability to extend Blakely to the federal context,
the Seventh Circuit easily invalidated the arguments made by the other
circuits in support of the Guidelines.215 It used the above-mentioned
theory that the Court had actually intended for the lower courts to
address this issue as a justification for refusing to hold that past
precedent forced it to uphold the Guidelines.216 The court also held that
the Blakely reasoning could still render the Guidelines unconstitutional
regardless of the fact that they were created by the administrative
Sentencing Commission rather than the legislature.217 The importance
ought not be placed on which body created the sentencing ranges, but on
208
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who found the facts that would enhance a defendant’s punishment, and
what standard would be used.218 Regardless of their origin, the
Guidelines were problematic because they were mandatory, and
therefore, “require that sentences be based on facts found by a judge.”219
Differentiating the Guidelines on the basis of this “administratively
promulgated” defense would ignore the spirit of the Supreme Court’s
Sixth Amendment concerns and fail in protecting the rights of defendants
to have sentence-enhancing facts found beyond a reasonable doubt by a
jury.220
While addressing these arguments, the Seventh Circuit placed much
emphasis on the dissenting opinions in Blakely.221 The Blakely majority
opinion had addressed Justices O’Connor and Breyer’s dissents, but “did
not say that they were wrong to suggest that the federal sentencing
guidelines could not be distinguished from the Washington sentencing
guidelines.”222 The circuit court was also careful to restrict its holding,
declaring that the Guidelines were only constitutionally problematic to
the extent they impeded a defendant’s right to a jury.223 By focusing not
only on the substantive arguments by the dissents, but also on the
reaction to those arguments made by the majority, the Seventh Circuit
was successful in fulfilling a dual role of deferring to the Court’s intent
while directing district courts in times of constitutional uncertainty.
Once it had addressed the threshold Blakely-application question,
the Seventh Circuit proceeded to provide a series of options for the
sentencing courts.224 The court highlighted the mandatory nature of the
Guidelines, but refused to go further and identify whether the mandatory
provisions could be severed to make the Guidelines constitutionally
acceptable.225 Instead, it left the severability question to the parties to
raise in the district court on remand.226 Should the lower court find the
mandatory provisions to be severable, the Seventh Circuit held that the
Guidelines would then be constitutional if the lower court used a
sentencing jury to determine any additional facts for enhancement.227 If
the provisions were not found to be severable, then the Guidelines would
have only advisory force, but the district courts could consider them
218
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while sentencing within the statutory range for the crime prescribed by
United States Code.228
The Seventh Circuit additionally offered an option by which the
sentencing court could avoid the severance issue entirely.229 This was the
approach taken by Judge Hornby in Fanfan—to sentence the defendant
based only on the facts that had been decided by the jury.230 The problem
with this, the Seventh Circuit noted, lay with the potential objection from
the government, which might still wish to attempt a sentence
enhancement.231 Regardless, the option remained available as a less risky
sentencing option.232 Finally, in line with the notion of safer sentencing
alternatives, the Seventh Circuit concluded the Booker opinion by
suggesting that “as a matter of prudence,” district court judges choose “a
nonguidelines alternative sentence” in addition to the sentence calculated
via the options listed above.233 The “nonguidelines alternative” existed
for the Seventh Circuit as a sentencing cushion, illustrating a prudence in
instructing the lower courts that the Fourth Circuit (discussed above)
would come to echo when it issued Hammoud two months later.234
The final circuit to fall on this side of the post-Blakely split was the
Ninth Circuit, which held in United States v. Ameline that the Supreme
Court’s reasoning applied to the Guidelines, but that the Guidelines were
not unconstitutional as a whole.235 Only two procedural provisions acted
to violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, and, the circuit court
found, those could be severed from the Guidelines.236 In holding that the
Blakely reasoning applied to the Guidelines, the Ninth Circuit rejected
the arguments about administrative promulgation and Supreme Court
precedent just as the Seventh Circuit had in Booker.237 The circuit court
then held that Blakely applied to the Guidelines and that because the
factors leading to defendant Alfred Arnold Ameline’s enhanced sentence
(the quantity of drugs and information about a weapon) were found by
the judge by a preponderance of the evidence, the sentence was
unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment and Blakely.238
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In response to a government argument, the court proceeded to take
up the severability issue with regard to 18 U.S.C. § 3742.239 Noting, as
the Booker Court would eventually decide, that § 3742 “appears to
contemplate that it is the district judge’s responsibility to make the
requisite findings of fact at sentencing,” the Ninth Circuit held that this
“assumption” was unconstitutional, however, the Guidelines could
survive as a consultation device because the provision could be
severed.240 The congressional intent behind the Guidelines was to
promote “consistency of sentences in cases that involve similar offense
conduct.”241 The Blakely Court, meanwhile, held a similar sentencing
scheme invalid because it allowed the judge to find enhancing factors
that raised a sentence above the statutory maximum on a preponderance
of the evidence standard.242 If a jury found those factors instead of a
judge, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, then the Blakely standard would be
met, Ameline’s Sixth Amendment rights would be protected, and
congressional intent would be preserved.243
The Guidelines were still mandatory under the Sixth Circuit’s
analysis, but there existed two paths for sentencing.244 The government
could give up on the enhancement attempt and the judge could sentence
based solely on the jury finding or plea bargain admissions (this is the
approach mentioned earlier in this paper and used by the Fanfan
court).245 Alternatively, the factors for enhancement should be argued to
a special sentencing jury (or to the judge should the defendant select that
option) on a reasonable doubt standard.246
IV. THE BOOKER DECISION
Booker found that the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment
because of their mandatory nature.247 The mandatory provisions could be
severed, however, and the Guidelines used as advisory, though the Court
allowed judges to retain a large amount of discretion over fact-finding in
the sentencing process, rendering unnecessary the use of such remedies
as a “sentencing jury.”248
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Given the turmoil created in the aftermath of Blakely, the apparent
ease with which the Court found the Guidelines to be indistinguishable
from the Washington State scheme is striking.249 Citing the Blakely
dissents, which had voiced strong concerns about the state of the
Guidelines and the potential effect of Blakely on sentencing
uniformity,250 the Booker Court simply held: “there is no distinction of
constitutional significance between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and the Washington procedures at issue in that case.”251 The issue was
quickly resolved in an opinion by Justice Stevens, which stated that both
the state and federal systems were constitutionally unsound because of
their mandatory nature.252
Were the Guidelines advisory, Justice Stevens noted, there would
be no constitutional problem, for Supreme Court case law supports
giving sentencing judges “broad discretion” when it comes to sentencing
defendants within a specific range.253 As mandatory provisions, however,
the Guidelines force “the selection of particular sentences in response to
differing sets of facts” which make inevitable the reality that “when a
trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a
defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the
facts that the judge deems relevant.”254
The Court supported its point by chronicling the “trend” in
sentencing—a shift in emphasis from jury findings toward a judge’s
ability, based on facts found by a preponderance of the evidence, to set
the ceiling for sentences.255 The solution to this diminution of jury power
could be found in the reasoning of Blakely and was “an answer not
motivated by Sixth Amendment formalism, but by the need to preserve
Sixth Amendment substance.”256 To protect this Sixth Amendment right,
the Court held that the facts arising from a jury trial or guilty plea must
govern the determination of a criminal sentence.257 Any information that
might increase a sentence beyond that “must be admitted by the
defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”258
Before arriving at this holding, Justice Stevens briefly addressed
some of the concerns that had plagued the circuit courts with regards to
249
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this threshold Blakely-application problem. Stare decisis did not pose a
problem, and by requiring additional facts be argued to a jury, the Court
was not violating Separation of Powers principles and turning the
administratively promulgated Guidelines into a legislative list of
crimes.259 Most significantly, the much analyzed argument that Blakely
should not apply to the Guidelines because they are the product of the
Sentencing Commission, as opposed to Congress, “lacks constitutional
significance.”260 The Justice dismissed this argument quickly, citing
Justice Scalia’s forceful language in Blakely, and held that the Sixth
Amendment protections for defendants are too important to be
jeopardized just because the Sentencing Commission was the body to
determine which facts warrant which sentence.261
With the initial inquiry of whether to apply Blakely solved, the
difficult question of what to do next was answered for the Court in a
separate opinion by Justice Breyer. The decision severed two provisions
of the Sentencing Reform Act, making the entire statute advisory in
nature.262 Given the determination by the majority, Justice Breyer framed
the remedial choice as being between two options—the first,
“superimposing the constitutional requirement” on the Guidelines, was
proposed in dissent by Justice Stevens, and the second, ultimately
adopted by the Court, involved “elimination of some provisions of the
statute.”263 The opinion began with an examination of the congressional
intent behind the Sentencing Reform Act, and concluded that Congress
would not want the Court to impose Justice Stevens’ remedy and have
the jury play such a prominent role in sentencing.264
While enacting the sentencing legislation, the Court held,
“Congress’s basic goal . . . was to move the sentencing system in the
direction of increased uniformity.”265 Uniformity meant that individual
sentences should relate closely to “real conduct,” so that defendants’
punishments adequately represent their actions.266 By “superimposing”
the Sixth Amendment jury trial requirement on the sentencing scheme,
Justice Breyer argued, the Court would actually be going against
Congress’s intentions.267 For example, that requirement would make it
unconstitutional for judges to consult pre-sentence reports—tools which,
259
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the Justice noted, Congress has implicitly supported for actions like
allowing a judge to reject a defendant’s agreement to a bad plea
bargain.268 As for cases that go to trial, the Court noted that “postverdict-acquired real conduct” often comes to light.269 Should the Court
require information be tried to a sentencing jury, it would be attenuating
that connection between sentencing and “real conduct” as well as placing
too much power in the hands of prosecutors—who would essentially
control the judge’s ability to sentence and the defendant’s ability to
negotiate, based on what charges they decided to bring.270 These
concerns, among others, were contrary to Congress’s intent and
consequently, the Court chose the second remedial option and severed
two sections: § 3553(b)(1), as well as § 3742(e),271 which the Ninth
Circuit, in Ameline, had predicted would be problematic after Blakely.272
As stated in Justice Stevens’ majority opinion regarding the
constitutionality of the Guidelines, the mandatory nature of § 3553(b)(1)
“is a necessary condition of the constitutional violation.”273 Without this
section, the Court held, the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act can still
be met—judges will have to consult the Guidelines as advisory, and will
still consider the policy concerns behind the Act while sentencing.274 The
Court asserted that judges will still be required “to impose sentences that
reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law,
provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public,
and effectively provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training and medical care.”275 These sentences may also be
appealed, though § 3742(e), the provision that sets standards for appeals,
is cross-referenced in § 3553(b)(1) and necessarily was also severed by
the Court.276 Instead of the de novo standard for departures imposed by §
3742(e), Justice Breyer instructed the circuit courts to examine
sentencing decisions via “review for ‘unreasonable[ness]’” a standard
which, the Justice maintained, the circuits had been using before §
3742(e) was amended in 2003.277 The Justice counseled the circuit courts
to look to the sentencing factors listed in § 3553(a) when reviewing a
sentence for unreasonableness.278
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Under the formulation presented by Justice Breyer, the Court
requires district judges to “consult [the] Guidelines and take them into
account when sentencing,” but it does not require the judges to apply
them.279 The Court explained the application of this system by affirming
the decision of the Seventh Circuit to reverse Booker’s sentence as
unconstitutional.280 While Fanfan’s sentence, relying only on the jury
findings, was constitutional, the Court vacated the decision in case the
Government opted to seek a resentencing.281
V. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS BETWEEN BLAKELY &
BOOKER.
The remedial provisions of the Booker decision were bold. Given
the lack of guidance offered by the Blakely Court,282 rulings made in
anticipation of the Supreme Court’s ultimate decision ought not be
judged too harshly. While the circuits together touched on many of the
issues presented by Justice Breyer in the remedial opinion of Booker,283
not one anticipated the severance of both 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) and 18
U.S.C. § 3742(e) to render the Guidelines advisory. Overall, even courts
professing an attempt to be prudent could be criticized under the
circumstances.284
Taking into account the roles our system requires the circuit courts
to play, however,285 it is possible to critique the effectiveness of the
choices made on the threshold Blakely application issue and, where
applicable, on the decisions regarding the remedial sentencing
provisions. These roles, as discussed at the beginning of this paper,
include not only the requirement that the circuit courts defer to Supreme
Court precedent and deliver those rulings accurately upon review of
district court decisions, but also that the circuit courts provide instruction
where needed.286 These two roles can create tension where the issue on
which the circuits offer instruction is not entirely on point with the
Court’s precedent and, consequently, leads to a kind of law making,
potentially creating splits among the circuits as well as a non-conformity
279
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with the interpretations of the Court.287 Keeping this in mind, the actions
of the circuits during the time period between Blakely and Booker
propose two conclusions about their success: Those making the riskier
decision to apply Blakely to the Guidelines were the most useful for the
district courts, and of these circuits, those choosing the more
conservative sentencing remedies were the most effective.
The circuits that remained cautious about applying the Blakely
reasoning to the Guidelines voiced a need to remain in line with Supreme
Court precedent and to give credit to Justice Scalia’s refusal to address
the Guidelines.288 The Court had upheld the Guidelines in the face of
constitutional challenges in the past.289 The anticipation and eventual
granting of certiorari also makes the decision not to take risks in this
context understandable. This is not a situation where the circuit split
might go unanswered. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit indicated that the
purpose of its expedited opinion in Booker was to draw the attention of
the Supreme Court early, so that its interpretation would not be
delayed.290 The Second Circuit’s conservative choice in Mincey to have
judges sentence according to circuit precedent was not, therefore, a
disservice to the district courts.291 Instead, the decision was an effort to
refrain from splintering federal law—a choice that was contingent upon
the fact that the Supreme Court would soon deliver a ruling on the
issue.292
Similarly, it was also understandable that the Sixth and Eighth
Circuits would vacate their decisions to apply Blakely to the Guidelines.
As illustrated above, the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Montgomery
presented an understanding of the legislative history of the Guidelines
that would turn out to be incorrect.293 Meanwhile, the Eighth Circuit took
great risks by holding in Mooney that the Guidelines were “wholly
unconstitutional.”294 It makes sense, therefore, that the circuit court
would vacate this interpretation of Blakely soon after the Supreme Court
granted certiorari on Booker and Fanfan.
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Though these circuits cannot be overly criticized for taking a
conservative position on the threshold Blakely application question, they
would have been more effective in their roles as conduit and guide if
they had taken a risk on the initial question. The Washington State
sentencing scheme was indeed “remarkably similar” to the federal
scheme, as the Seventh and Ninth Circuits noted.295 Justice Scalia’s
refusal to address the Guidelines in Blakely did not mean that they ought
not to be addressed in the Sixth Amendment context.296 The Seventh
Circuit had a strong argument that Justice Scalia’s additional refusal in
Blakely—the refusal to say that the dissents were incorrect in declaring
that the Guidelines would be at risk following Blakely—was very
persuasive.297 Equally persuasive was that Circuit’s recognition that,
despite the prior Supreme Court case law in this area, the Sixth
Amendment issue raised in Blakely was the type that the Court was
looking for the lower courts to address.298 The First, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits served their role of interpreting the Supreme Court’s intention to
apply the Blakely reasoning to the Guidelines well.
As for their second role as instructor to the federal courts, some
sentencing remedies delivered the interpretation of Supreme Court intent
better than others. Though a risk was wise for the threshold question,
restraint was best in the remedial context given the choices made by the
Supreme Court in Booker.299 As the Booker Court implied, the Fanfan
approach of sticking strictly to the jury verdict while sentencing was
perhaps the most prudent course of action for the circuit courts choosing
to apply Blakely to the Guidelines.300 This course, while defendantfriendly and clearly in keeping with the Sixth Amendment, was not the
most fulfilling option for the government. It seems likely that defendants
sentenced in accordance with this practice during the time between
Blakely and Booker will face an appeal and possibly more jail time.301
In his post-Blakely analysis of potential avenues for circuit courts
applying Blakely to the Guidelines, Frank Bowman noted that “[b]ecause
Blakely appears to prohibit a judge from making the factual findings
necessary to employ sentence-enhancing factors, a judge who decides
that the Guidelines must be Blakely-ized is obliged to confer sentences
lower, sometimes far lower, than the Guidelines would require for a
295
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defendant in the presence of the same factual findings.”302 This was
clearly the case in Fanfan, and the result, Judge Hornby noted, “although
perhaps surprising to those of us who have been laboring under guideline
sentencing for these many years . . . would not bother the Blakely
court.”303 By applying this reasoning to the sentencing procedures,
judges like Judge Hornby were following the safest route toward
maintaining the legality of sentencing between Blakely and Booker.304 It
was the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance in this area that required this
cautious step; further, even this safe option will require remands and
appeals in most cases where the government tries to achieve lengthier
sentences, as evidenced by the Court’s remand of the Fanfan decision.305
With Ameline, the Ninth Circuit came closest to the Booker
decision by actually addressing the severance issue, although admittedly,
it did not sever all of the necessary provisions.306 The Ameline decision
was the most risky of the group, particularly given the Booker Court’s
decision that sentencing juries are unnecessary.307 In his analysis of the
post-Blakely decisions of the federal courts, Bowman suggests that
severability was a lightly touched issue because of its “unpalatable
choices,” namely invalidation of the entire Sentencing Reform Act
versus “a federal sentencing system cobbled together by the judiciary
from selected fragments of the Act and general Sixth Amendment and
due process doctrines, featuring as its centerpiece completely unfettered
trial court sentencing discretion.”308 While this is a valid observation, the
Ninth Circuit’s attempt to tackle the Sixth Amendment concerns while
preserving the scope of the Sentencing Reform Act was an admirable
move under the circumstances. The court had the rule of Blakely on the
one hand, and the importance of Congress’s goal of uniformity in
sentencing on the other.309 It refused to find the Guidelines
unconstitutional in their entirety because that route “would do far greater
violence to Congress’ intent than if we merely excised the
unconstitutional procedural requirements.”310
By choosing to keep the Guidelines and have sentencing juries find
facts applicable to enhancements, the Ninth Circuit chose a middle
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ground between Bowman’s two extremes and offered a good option for
sentencing in theory, but it would have better served its district courts if
it had acted with more restraint and taken a cue from the Seventh
Circuit.311 The Seventh Circuit left the severance question open for
remand, but still cautioned the district courts to calculate a nonGuidelines “alternative sentence” in case the Guidelines were found to be
unconstitutional in the future.312 Had the Ameline court adopted this
suggestion, it would have placed its sentencing judges in a much safer
position given the decision by the Booker Court to render the Guidelines
advisory.313
The Fourth Circuit attempted to cover all of its bases in Hammoud,
by keeping the Guidelines as valid, but recommending advisory
sentences as well.314 The court did this to “serve judicial economy,” and
was concerned that sentencing courts should address issues that might be
important “when the facts and circumstances [are] clearly in mind”
should the Supreme Court invalidate the Guidelines.315 However, it is a
valid complaint that the process of issuing two sentences while refusing
to apply the Blakely reasoning might have foiled the ultimate purpose of
“judicial economy.”316 Indeed, as Circuit Judge Widener noted in partial
concurrence and partial dissent in Hammoud, if the “advisory-only
sentence” constitutes less time than the one under the Guidelines, “an
appeal will be guaranteed.”317 That realistic observation undermines the
“judicial economy” premise.318 Also pertinent is Circuit Judge Widener’s
additional argument that by suggesting that sentencing judges issue two
sentences, the circuit court is building a foundation of uncertainty around
its decision and “can only indicate to others a doubt, which should not
exist, as to the outcome of the principal question in this case, the effect,
if any, of Blakely on Guidelines sentencing.”319 A circuit court ought not,
when addressing the law during such a tumultuous time, seem uncertain
in its result.320 Still, the Fourth Circuit was operating to preserve the
sentencing system, and these directions, while perhaps a “wasted effort”
as the court acknowledged,321 may indeed prove to have been well
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offered as the numerous sentencing appeals are remanded to the district
courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
The time period between Blakely and Booker provided a unique
atmosphere for analyzing the effectiveness of the circuit courts in
fulfilling the roles that our judicial structure requires of them.322 Little
about the constitutional viability of the Guidelines was certain after
Blakely, and although Justices O’Connor and Breyer provided strong
arguments that the Guidelines were in peril, they were still dissenting
opinions.323 It was unclear how much they ought to be relied upon.324
Still, the circuits here were called to interpret the Court’s reasoning, just
as they would have been in any other context.325 They had the added duty
of potentially taking risks in offering much-needed instruction to the
district courts.326 Though it was understandable that the majority of the
circuits would act conservatively and choose not to apply the reasoning
of Blakely to invalidate the Guidelines, those circuits that were less
traditional in this area better fulfilled their role of conduit between the
Supreme Court and the district courts. Additionally, those who chose to
guide sentencing judges via conservative sentencing remedies acted in
the best interest of the district courts.
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